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The Difficulties of Democratic Mercy
Aziz Z. Huq*
Dean Martha Minow’s wide-ranging and learned Jorde lecture
“Forgiveness, Law, and Justice” is characteristic in its unstinting ambition.1
The lecture does not only sweep in complex normative and empirical questions
concerning the relationship of legal institutions and rules to a capaciously
defined concept of “forgiveness.” It furthermore aspires beyond the sublunary
scholarly task of delimiting and describing. Unconfined to the desiccated
philological minutia of a Casaubon,2 Dean Minow instead approaches her topic
with dauntless optimism and eyes fixed firmly on empyrean-minded aspiration.
To follow her argument is to be apprised of the possibility of a stronger loving
world, and to have one’s own parochial and reflexive skepticism—the coin of
the realm in the law school workshop—put to shame.
Yet to speak in aspirational terms should not mean dispensing with the
question of how a given vision of justice can be attained, or diagnosing with
precision the barriers to its realization.3 So while I share Dean Minow’s large
ambitions for law as a catalyst for interpersonal and social reform, my
commentary here will focus narrowly on the impediments to that ambition. My
aspirations here are modest along several margins. To begin with, my aim is
narrow in both conceptual and geographical terms. Although Dean Minow
anchors her topic with a parsimonious definition of forgiveness as “a conscious,
deliberate decision to forego rightful grounds for grievance against those who
have committed a wrong or harm,”4 her discussion overflows that definition to
touch on several related, but nonetheless distinct, normatively infused concepts.
In the course of her exegesis, moreover, she ranges through a set of
geographically disparate examples that include transitional justice mechanisms
in South Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone; the exercise of prosecutorial
* Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago
Law School. My thanks to Caitlin Foley; I am also pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank
Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund.
1
Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Justice, and the Law, -- CALIF. L. REV. -- (2015).
2
Not all philologists are as narrow-minded or intellectually impoverished as Dorothea Brooke’s
unfortunate elect. See, e.g., JAMES C. TURNER, PHILOLOGY: THE FORGOTTEN ORIGINS OF THE
MODERN HUMANITIES (2014).
3
Even the prophetic voices most admired today had specific and nuanced diagnoses of the social
pathologies they confronted, not merely diaphanous hopes of a better world. See, e.g., Tommie
Shelby, Justice & Racial Conciliation: Two Visions, DAEDALUS, Winter 2011, at 95, 96-99
(describing Martin Luther King Jr.’s precise and unsparing understanding of the “racial realities of
his day”).
4
Minow, supra note 1, at --.
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discretion in the International Criminal Court; the treatment of former child
soldiers; and the discharge of sovereign debt obligations under the so-called
“odious debt” doctrine.5
Eschewing that conceptual and geographic breadth, I will focus on
only one of the concepts that Dean Minow seriatim conjures. I will also invoke
solely the vulgar demotic of American law. More specifically, this commentary
homes concentrates upon our domestic experience with what Dean Minow’s
colleague Carol Steiker terms “legal institutions of mercy”6 to examine the
conditions under which democratic mercy is feasible. These institutions have
either wholesale or retail power to mitigate civil or criminal liability. The
simple claim that I want to advance is that our own rich experience under the
U.S. Constitution suggests that it is extraordinarily difficult to institutionalize
such official forbearance—especially on democratic soil—and especially when
our political economy, in its superfluously punitive modalities, generates the
need for forgiveness. Rather than seeking for redemptive reforms through
democratic process, I suggest that the institutional installation of merciful
discretion often requires a dispensation from, and limits to, the otherwise
democratic order.
My response proceeds in three steps. I begin by offering some analytic
clarification by disentangling three distinct concepts at work across Dean
Minow’s examples—forgiveness, mercy, and excuse—and by showing how the
law can play different functions depending on which of these normative
concepts is at stake. I next explain why a domestic focus, as opposed to the
international lens that Dean Minow employs, may reap dividends for her
project. The third—and most substantial—element of the commentary
examines the operation of mercy in the domestic domain with an eye to
understanding why its dispensation is so impoverished. I conclude by pointing
to the nettlesome trade-offs, most importantly between democracy and mercy,
that Dean Minow’s proposals invite—tradeoffs that, in my view, admit of no
easy solution.
I.
Distinct, yet easily confused, concepts are at play across the examples
that Dean Minow assembles.7 All concern on the one hand, some sort of
response to a wrong, and on the other hand, some sort of renunciation or setting
aside of otherwise lawful or appropriate consequence. Despite this
commonality, they can be organized into three classes. First, Dean Minow’s
examples pick out a concept of forgiveness that arises in bilateral relations
between individuals. Forgiveness, as illustrated in Dean Minow’s discussion of
5

Id. at --.
Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 21 (Austin Sarat & Nassar Hussain eds., 2007).
Professor Steiker’s focus in this chapter is different from mine: She is focused on reconciling the
use of mercy with different theories of punishment; I am concerned with its political economy.
7
Many previous commentators have noted the frequency with which these concepts are treated as
fungible. See Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162 (1988) (noting that mercy is often confused with other virtues like
excuse, justification, and forgiveness).
6
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divorce mediation and transitional justice,8 is comprised of a change in one
person’s disposition or attitude toward another.9 It involves a psychological
change, and “needs no observable action.”10 Second, on my reading Dean
Minow invokes a distinctly institutional concept of mercy. The latter is an
official exercise of discretion to mitigate a legal consequence that is otherwise a
person’s lawful fate.11 Unlike forgiveness, mercy cannot be a change in
dispositions only. It also needs issue in a consequence, typically some sort of
forbearance from the implementation of an otherwise permissible civil or
criminal penalty.12 In addition, mercy is often characterized by a measure of
particularity, and hence ex ante unpredictability, in its operation. As my
colleague and fellow commentator Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, one
philosophical tradition of mercy, closely associated with the philosopher
Seneca, “entails regarding each particular case as a complex narrative of human
effort,” and then devoting close, empathic attention to the internal experience
of those particulars.13 The particularity of mercy—its standard-like rather than
rule-like character to use the legal argot14—distinguishes it from our third
category: the more rule-like forms of discretion, such as the familiar criminallaw doctrines of excuse or justification.15 Where mitigating discretion operates
in a wholesale fashion according to crisp rules prescribed ex ante, such as in the
treatment of child soldiers under international criminal law described by Dean
Minow,16 then neither forgiveness nor mercy are at stake, but instead excuse or
another rule-like form of mitigation.
Each of these concepts—forgiveness, mercy, and excuse—is distinct
and freestanding. Each can also be tethered to distinct and different functions
for law and legal institutions. Hence, on Dean Minow’s accounting, although
the state itself cannot forgive—at least in the sense of adopting a new
psychological dispensation toward a wrongdoing—it can thus create
institutional arrangements that engender opportunities for individuals to
forgiveness.17 For example, it can provide a forum for the mending of personal
relationships in divorce and tort disputes.18 Alternatively, the law can intercede
strategically to alter the relationship of whole social groups such as the

8

Minow, supra note 1, at --.
On the necessarily interpersonal character of forgiveness, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION 248 (1958) (characterizing forgiveness as “dependent upon others”).
10
Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1440 (2004).
11
Murphy, supra note 7, at 3; see also Markel, supra note 10, at 1436 (“Mercy [is] the remission
of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics
that evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s offense.”).
12
H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352, 353 (1971).
13
Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, in SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 154, 166-67 (1999).
14
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562 (1992).
15
Cf. Markel, supra note 10, at 1440-41 (distinguishing mercy from the use of “articulable
standards of desert in relation to culpability and the severity of the offense”).
16
Minow, supra note 1, at --.
17
Cf. id. at – (noting the importance of spatial arrangements in transitional justice institutions that
allow for proximity between victims and perpetrators, and thus enable forgiveness inducing
encounters to occur).
18
Id. at --.
9

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576870

3/11/15 11:10 AM

104

[Vol. XX:nnn

different races in post-Apartheid South Africa.19 The state’s role here is
epistemic: a transitional justice institution that generates disclosures—or, more
likely, articulates expressly what hitherto has been a “public secret”20—thereby
dissolving an impediment to frank and full intergroup recognition, and then
enabling forgiveness and social progress. Or finally, the state can itself
renounce a civil or criminal penalty against a liable or culpable person, either
by announcing a general mitigating rule or by vesting an official with
exculpatory discretion.21 Simply put, society moves on as a practical matter
without regard to lingering beliefs and dispositions. In the latter category fall a
substantial number of Dean Minow’s examples, including the operation of
some transitional justice regimes, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under
the Rome Statute, and the operation of the odious debt doctrine in relation to
sovereign debt.22 In short, just as we can disentangle a number of operative
concepts in Dean Minow’s account, so too we can conjure a wide array of
permutations respecting’s law’s function.
I am skeptical I can say anything meaningful about so diverse an array
of psychological and institutional concepts, let alone about the distinct and
different roles that law and legal institutions might play in service of the
different concepts. Consequently, I will focus on the one category that strikes
me as most interesting, in part because it is likely the one that is most difficult
to get off the ground: these are the instances in which the law vests relatively
unconstrained discretion in an individual, usually an official, to dispense with
an otherwise applicable civil or criminal penalty—in other words the operation
of “legal institutions of mercy.”23 In my account, this term captures those legal
institutions that are delegated or reserved some measure of discretionary
authority to mitigate public law penalties.24 That discretion can be exercised
either wholesale (as a rule-like excuse) or retail (as standard-like mercy). Such
entities have special salience in the criminal justice context, but also play a role
when the state commits a serious, constitutional wrong.
The reason to focus on a class of predominantly criminal examples is
straightforward: it is the hardest case for mitigation, but also arguably where
qualities of forgiveness and mercy are most needful.25 Criminal liability often
19

Id. at --.
For the concept of a “public secret,” or what is generally known but, for one reason or another,
cannot easily be articulated, see MICHAEL TAUSSIG, DEFACEMENT: PUBLIC SECRECY AND THE
LABOR OF THE NEGATIVE 5-6 (1999).
21
There is also a mixed case in which the state arranges for conditional amnesties from
prosecutions, where the mitigation of penalties depends on positive disclosures by the defendant
or alternatively (in, say, the case of child soldiers) participation in a program of demobilization
and reintegration.
22
Minow, supra note 1, at --.
23
Steiker, supra note 6, at 21.
24
I will focus largely on criminal law and constitutional rules. I do not address private law matters
of tort, family law, or contract.
25
I elide here the question of ‘needful on what ground?’ Dean Minow’s lecture does not state
whether she is a welfarist, some other sort of consequentialist, or whether she rejects
consequentialism altogether. I suspect the latter. Given the tenor of her lecture, she may find
persuasive some of Bernard Williams’s acute critiques of utilitarianism as a system that
20
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involves both the most serious class of wrongs, ranked by some theorists as
more disruptive of social relations than comparative economic or natural
disasters,26 and the gravest species of punishment. Assuming that forgiveness is
a normatively appropriate response to a criminal wrong,27 what sort of
circumstances can democratic institutions coexist with legal institutions of
mercy? And can our democracy dispense with penalties under those
circumstances when a mitigating grace is most warranted?
II.
To explore these questions, I believe we are better off focusing on our
domestic circumstances rather than the international examples that Dean
Minow considers. To establish the bona fides of this analytic shift, I examine
here two of her examples—the design and operation of transitional justice
institutions and the effects of debt forgiveness—to show that we gain more
traction from attention to municipal experience, as opposed to international
experience.
Several of Dean Minow’s examples of forgiveness or mercy in
operation, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South
Africa and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute,
concern instances of “transitional justice,” which has been defined as “the
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized
by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor
regimes.”28 Transitional justice institutions include both truth commissions akin
to the TRC,29 and also criminal prosecutions of former regime officials.30
Almost all instances of transitional justice, however, emerge from different

eccentrically treats “utilities and preference schedules as all there is” and indulges in the “illusion
that preferences are already given, that the role of [law] is just to follow them.” Bernard Williams,
A critique of utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 144, 147 (1973) (emphasis in original). I have thus framed my commentary to avoid the
attribution of a utilitarian perspective to Dean Minow.
26
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 32-33 (W.D. Halls trans., MacMillan
& Co. 1984) (1893) (“In the penal law of most civilized peoples murder is universally regarded as
the greatest of crimes. Yet an economic crisis, a crash on the stock market, even a bankruptcy, can
disorganize the body social much more seriously than the isolated case of homicide.”); id. at 38-39
(arguing that “an act is criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the collective
consciousness,” not merely because it has widespread disruptive effects).
27
For an argument that mercy cannot be reconciled with retributivism, see Alwynne Smart,
Mercy, 43 PHIL. 345 (1968).
28
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003) (footnote
omitted); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
29
See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 269 (2011) (counting 29 truth commissions); PRISCILLA B.
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 291-97 (2001)
(listing twenty truth commissions established since 1982).
30
SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 268 (listing 48 countries with “transitional human rights
prosecutions”).
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national contexts in different historical, geopolitical, and socioeconomic
moments.
As a threshold matter, it is important to resist the temptation to see
transitional justice as a sui generis problem. Transitional justice is not
analytically distinct from “ordinary” justice, which must also “routinely cope
with policy shifts caused by economic and technological shocks and by
changes in the value judgments of citizens and legal elites.”31 At the same time,
there may be reason to believe that examination of the delimited class of cases
labeled “transitional” will yield only limited generalizable lessons, and that an
analysis of the law’s relationship to forgiveness gets off the ground more
easily, and with more sure-footed results, by starting in a more mundane
municipal context.
The first problem is that the number of truth commissions (twentyeight)32 and international criminal courts (at best no more than ten)33 is
relatively small. Each example of transitional justice is characterized by sharply
distinct socio-economic, geopolitical, and historical-institutional variance.
Efforts to understand why forgiveness or mercy works in one context but
seemingly not in others is therefore handicapped by the need to untangle the
distinct effect of legal institutions from a host of other background dynamics.
As Dean Minow candidly concedes, therefore, efforts to generalize from
historical experiences of transitional justice confront considerable identification
hurdles.34
Even the case studies upon which Dean Minow focuses upon yield few
unambiguous lessons. Consider here her analysis of the South African TRC.35
To reach a judgment about the social value of the TRC—its capacity to knit
together the frayed bonds of social fabric across racial lines—it is worth going
beyond the assessment Dean Minow offers of its direct consequences. It is also
necessary to examine its opportunity costs. The TRC required the allocation of
considerable human, institutional, and fiscal capital in the early days of the
post-Apartheid transition. Even if we are focused narrowly on the prospects for
restoring a social fabric frayed or eviscerated by racial discrimination, as Dean
Minow appears to be, there is an important question about how alternatively the
human and material resources used for the TRC could have been deployed to
build social capital and cohesion. The question has force because the South
African state today routinely fails to supply the basic public good of security
31

Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice As Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 764 (2004).
32
SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 269.
33
Enumerations seem rare in the literature, although narrative histories count few institutions. See,
e.g., Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787-90 (2006) (providing a brief history of
international criminal tribunals’ development).
34
It is perhaps telling that Kathryn Sikkink’s account of the diffusion of transitional justice-related
norms globally identifies domestic prosecutions as playing an important catalytic role in
generating a widespread norm against immunity for grave human rights abuses. SIKKINK, supra
note 29, at 109-10.
35
See Minow, supra note 1, at --.
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from violent crime.36 Vigilitanism is rife, while mob violence is routinely
directed at real and perceived sources of disorder, especially immigrants from
Mozambique and other neighboring states.37 While the wealthy purchase
private security, a large impoverished (and mostly black and colored) majority
is left to their own devices, thus creating a “hegemony of the very same social
groups that held sway under apartheid” at the expense of “the very same groups
cast out by the logic of white supremacy.”38
A recent empirical study of police and state legitimacy in South Africa
that I conducted with colleagues from Oxford University, the London School of
Economics, and the Human Sciences Research Counsel in Durban
demonstrates that state failure in this regard has led directly to a substantial
drop in the legitimacy of the police and the state.39 Drawing on a nationally
representative sample of 3,183 citizens, that study found stark racial and
economic divisions in judgments of the legitimacy of the state.40 In effect,
“whites are considerably more likely to feel they have a duty to obey the police
than black South Africans,” in part because the latter are more likely to
perceive the police as being ineffectual in dealing with violent crime.41 The
racially disparate delivery of security from crime as a public good, in short, has
direct effects on perceptions of the legitimacy of the state.42 Rather than uniting
citizens, the state thus effectively drives an emotional and affective wedge
between whites and blacks.
It could be inferred from this that post-Apartheid criminal justice
institutions have not only failed their basic mission, but that they have failed in
a way that reproduces the stark racial divides that characterized Apartheid
society.43 To the extent that the goal of transitional justice institutions such as
the TRC were aimed at reconstituting social relations without subordinating
racial hierarchies, it is therefore fair to ask whether the ensuing allocation of
resources was wise. It may well be that South Africa’s limited pool of legal
36

In 2011, about 50 murders, 100 rapes, almost 400 armed burglaries, and more than 500 violent
assaults were reported every day in South Africa. Kill and be killed, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 2011,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21526932.
37
For acute studies of recent ethnic riots in South Africa, see Aidan Mosselson, ‘There is no
difference between citizens and non-citizens anymore’: Violent xenophobia, citizenship and the
politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa, 36 J. S. AFR. STUD. 641 (2010); Jonny
Steinberg, Security and Disappointment: Policing, Freedom and Xenophobia in South Africa, 52
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2011).
38
T.R. Samara, Order and security in the city: producing race and policing neoliberal spaces in
South Africa, 33 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 637, 651 (2010).
39
Ben Bradford, Aziz Z. Huq, Jon P. Jackson & Ben Roberts, What Price Fairness when Security
is at Stake? Police Legitimacy in South Africa, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 246 (2014).
40
Id. at 256-57.
41
Id. at 257-68.
42
Id. at 257 (figure 2, reporting relationship of police effectiveness and legitimacy).
43
The state’s response instead may have done more harm than good to racial equality. See, e.g.,
Steinberg, supra note 37, at 9 (noting police reliance in black townships upon “high density, high
mobility, paramilitary policing” to vindicate social order). Evidence of how corrosive state failure
to provide security against crime is to legitimacy is available beyond the South African context.
See, e.g., Justice Tankebe, Self-Help, Policing, and Procedural Justice: Ghanaian Vigilantism and
the Rule of Law, 43 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 245 (2009).
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expertise and institutional capital may well have been better assigned to
building fair and noncorrupt police and judicial institutions for millions of
black South Africans, rather than to enabling a mere 429 people44 to confront
their past. To think that transitional justice is the path to social reintegration and
racial harmony is to ignore the quotidian experiences of millions of ordinary
South Africans.
The point here can be generalized: transitional justice institutions are
often established in the wake of particularly severe governance shocks, and
coincide with a need for substantial reconstruction, or construction ex nihilo, of
legal institutions. Scarcity of financial resources, not to mention of legal and
human capital, may be far more acute in transitional justice contexts than in the
operation of ordinary criminal justice systems. As a result, the effect of
transitional justice investments upon the values that Dean Minow emphasizes is
not a simple matter, but rather is contingent on complex questions concerning
the alternative uses of resources in developing effectual justice institutions.
Judgments about forgiveness-related legal investments raise especially
nettlesome questions in delicate moments of political transition. To offer
predictions about how the law can be employed to promote forgiveness or
produce mercy, therefore, a focus on ordinary domestic institutions of criminal
justice may be warranted. Although opportunity costs exist in these
circumstances, more possibilities obtain for observing how different
institutional choices achieve or retard normatively desirable goals are greater.
Lessons in institutional design may also be more generalizable because of
greater regularities in the basic aims and operation of domestic criminal justice
systems, as opposed to the high variance circumstances of transitional justice.
Similar concerns can be offered about Dean Minow’s sovereign debt
example. Here, the problem of adequate numerosity to reach judgments with
external validity is especially acute. Beyond the 1932 Tinoco arbitration
between Costa Rica and Great Britain,45 crisp exemplars of odious debt
forgiveness are hard to discern.46 Moreover, as Dean Minow candidly
recognizes, even if such a doctrine obtained, its consequences are uncertain.47 It
seems perilous to deploy what little international experience exists as the
ground to build the general proposition that the legal mitigation of debt can
yield valuable social change. To do so when less fragile ground is available
seems unnecessary.
44

Minow, supra note 1, at --.
Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56
DUKE L.J. 1201, 1216 (2007).
46
Id. at 1221 (noting that the “concept of odious debts languished in something of a doctrinal
backwater for many years,” and describing arguments based on the concept after the second Iraq
war); cf. Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There A Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious
Debts?, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 749, 771 (2007) (concluding that “odious debt is not
accepted as a rule of international law”). Gulati has elsewhere identified “multiple instances of the
United States engaging in and ratifying repudiations of debts contracted by previous regimes.”
Sarah Ludington, Mitu Gulati, & Alfred L. Brophy, Applied Legal History: Demystifying the
Doctrine of Odious Debts, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 247, 249 (2010).
47
Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2007) (arguing against recognition of the doctrine).
45
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Further, it is unclear whether Dean Minow need resort to a
controversial rara avis of international law to advance her argument. Price
Fishback, Kenneth Snowden, and Jonathan Rose have recently demonstrated
that the New Deal era Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) programs,
purchasing loans from private lenders and refinancing them on easier terms,
had substantial benefits to home owners at a time of large dislocation and
economic distress.48 More recently—and inspired by HOLC’s experience—
Arif Mian and Amir Sufi have argued that a greater willingness to write-down
underwater mortgage debt after 2008 would have both reduced the extent of the
recession and blunted its welfare effects.49 Although defended by both sets of
authors in narrow welfarist terms, debt reduction in both historical eras likely
advanced the wider set of values Dean Minow considers salient.
Moreover, American historical experience with debt reduction not only
supports the arc of Dean Minow’s general argument, it also yields a useful
cautionary lesson about how debt forgiveness can be implemented to
exacerbate other social harms. Although HOLC refinancings were
accomplished in relatively even-handed ways, HOLC’s scheme for rating
neighborhoods based on their racial composition was taken up by the Federal
Housing Authority and deployed to make first-time home purchases cheaper for
whites than for blacks.50 More recently, the federal government’s failure to
press for mortgage write-downs in the wake of the 2008 recession must be
understood against the back-drop of a highly racialized targeting of subprime
lending, and a consequent pattern of foreclosures and economic distress in
which African-Americans and Hispanics fared far worse than whites.51 The
domestic experience of debt and debt relief, in short, is far richer and far more
morally charged than its international counterpart,52 and thus provides much
richer loam for nourishing, and setting bounds to, Dean Minow’s argument.
48

PRICE FISHBACK, KENNETH SNOWDEN, & JONATHAN ROSE, WELL WORTH SAVING: HOW THE
NEW DEAL SAFEGUARDED HOME OWNERSHIP (2013).
49
ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT 140-41 (2013) (summarizing expected effects of
greater debt reduction during the recent recession).
50
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 196-8, 202-08 (1985) (describing the A through D rating system used by HOLC, and its
use by the Federal Housing Authority). The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) insured first-time
mortgages. Without a FHA guarantee, first-time lenders were often unable to obtain credit.
Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy:
Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1308-11 (1995).
51
Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis,
75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 634 (2014) (“[T] he housing boom and the immense profits it generated
frequently came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner suburbs who
were targeted by specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of national banks and subjected to
discriminatory lending practices.”); see also SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., IMPACT OF THE
GREAT RECESSION AND BEYOND: DISPARITIES IN WEALTH BUILDING BY GENERATION AND
RACE 16-17 (2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413102-Impact-of-theGreat-Recession-and-Beyond.pdf (reporting large disparities in wealth loss between black and
white families).
52
The anthropologist David Graeber has persuasively argued that the social institution of debt
reflects “a set of institutions of what humans are and what they owe one another, that have now
been so deeply ingrained that we cannot see them.” DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000
YEARS 123-24 (2011).
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III
In the balance of this commentary, I turn to the domestic criminal
justice context and ask whether analytic purchase can be obtained there
concerning the law’s capacity for cultivating forgiveness and enacting mercy.
That experience is especially rich because the Constitution encompasses no less
than four institutional seats of merciful discretion. First, there is the
discretionary equitable authority possessed by federal courts under Articles I
and III.53 Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an almost
unbounded equitable discretion on the part of prosecutors to ascertain what
criminal charges to bring or not bring.54 Third, the executive has seemingly
untrammeled authority to pardon criminal offenses.55 And finally, the grand
jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment and the petit jury rule of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution56 both create instruments with what at first
blush seems discretionary authority to exercise mercy and to remit criminal
punishment.
The Constitution, then, contains an embarrassment of merciful riches.
Yet close examination of these four discrete institutional sites of discretionary
authority at work today reveals not one that is, in fact, capable of suttling mercy
or catalyzing forgiveness in a meaningful fashion. Nor is it clear any one could.
Each of these institutions’ powers has been narrowly construed, or hedged
around with disabling institutional counterweights. Each consequently falls
short of the redemptive ambitions glimpsed by Dean Minow. The reason for
this, I will argue, roots back to the democratic pedigree of legal authority in the
United States, and the tendency of political economies that provide occasions
for mercy to simultaneously stifle the instruments of mercy.
To pursue this argument, I will focus primarily on American
experience with equitable judicial discretion and with prosecutorial discretion,
the two sites of merciful discretion that have proved responsive to democratic
pressures in interesting ways despite their notional separation from democratic
politics. Yet it is worth pausing briefly before turning to these institutions, and
noting the current state of presidential pardoning and juries as means of
implementing merciful mitigation. In brief, the current state of presidential
pardons and jury is penurious and threadbare in the extreme. The presidential
pardon has dwindled to a shadow of its former self.57 The grand jury, while
53

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, art. III, § 2 (respectively the Suspension Clause and the grant of
power to hear all cases “in Law and Equity”).
54
For recognition of the broad scope of prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465-70 (1996); United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
55
U.S. CONST. art. II § 2 cl. 1; see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-11 (1925)
(emphasizing the scope of the pardon power); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)
(same).
56
U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. VI.
57
To date, President Obama has granted 52 pardons in comparison to Richard Nixon’s 863, Harry
Truman’s 1913, and William McKinley’s 191. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Clemency Statistics (last
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formally a check on prosecutors, is largely ineffectual,58 except as a means of
muffling and deflecting responsibility for controversial charging decisions.59
The petit jury is a vestigial remnant of our adversarial system of criminal
justice,60 now long superseded by a plea bargaining process wholly within the
prosecutor’s control.61 Even in those instances in which a jury trial occurs, the
scope of discretion enjoyed by ordinary citizens against the state is limited.62
Whereas their Founding era analogs would have enjoyed a plenary “right and
power to consider legal as well as factual issues,”63 today a juror who claimed
authority to resist the court’s direction on matters of law would be met at best
with reprimands and at worst criminal sanctions.64
If pardons and jurors play no meaningful mitigation function today,
their respective desuetudes are nevertheless illustrative of two slightly different
ways in which legal institutions of mercy are extinguished. Whereas the pardon
has been abandoned under political pressure and without institutional change,
the role of the jury has been hedged in by institutional changes, such as the rise
of plea-bargaining, and legal reform, such as the rejection of jury discretion
over matters of law and the criminalization of jury nullification demands. The
decline of these legal institutions of mercy evinces on the one hand a tension
with democracy, and on the other hand a tendency for professionalized
institutions that are systemic repeat-players—here, prosecutors and judges—to
crowd out institutions drawn by sortation from a larger democratic pool. Mercy
is vulnerable to both democratic and technocratic pressure.
In contrast to the null results an analysis of juries and pardons yields,
the trajectory of the equitable judicial discretion and prosecutorial discretion is
rather more complex. In sketching brief accounts of how both fail to further
Dean Minow’s ambitions, I necessarily simplify, offering snapshots rather than
comprehensive accounts of complex institutional phenomena.
visited Jan. 19, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm. Even these
statistics understate the expected role of the pardon power, which was used with much greater
frequency in the early Republic to make “exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt.” George
Lardner Jr., & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of
Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT’G. REP. 212, 212-18 (2007).
58
For a devastating critique of the current operation of grand juries, see Andrew D. Leipold, Why
Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 323 (1995)
(“In almost all cases, a criminal defendant would be just as well off without the grand jury as he is
with it.”).
59
Cf. Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen in Prosecutor’s Decision to Release Ferguson Grand
Jury Materials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A16.
60
JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 26 (2010), available at
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
(noting that 97 percent of federal cases are resolved by plea bargain).
61
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2471-76 (2004) (describing prosecutors' incentives to obtain pleas).
62
Indeed, we have all but lost the sense of the jury as a site of political participation akin to the
ballot box, as richly explored in Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin
to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
63
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 238 (2005).
64
Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 492-94 (1998) (collecting examples).
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We can usefully begin with what upon first impression might seem the
more promising locus of merciful discretion—the equitable discretion of the
federal courts. Two textual elements of the Constitution warrant the conclusion
that federal courts possess a measure of discretionary equitable authority:
Article III’s reference to “equity”65 jurisdiction originating in the English Court
of Chancery,66 and Article I’s Suspension Clause,67 which referenced by
implication the traditionally equitable remedy of habeas corpus.68 Although the
systems of law and equity have been merged for almost 80 years now,69 it
remains the case that courts must often exercise a “flexible and
comprehensive”70 discretion in determining the scope of public law remedies,
including but not limited to habeas corpus. To understand the possibility of the
federal courts as “legal institutions of mercy,” therefore, we can usefully
examine the manner in which judges have exercised their discretion to calibrate
not just the equitable remedy of habeas, but more generally the suite of public
law remedies used to maintain the state within constitutional bounds.71
Beginning with habeas, an analysis of judicial discretion in the design
of public law remedies reveals that courts have not exercised their equitable
authority in ways to advance Dean Minow’s normative goals. The equitable
writ of habeas corpus, in its pure form, is meant to be a remedy against
executive detention.72 Yet here in its historic heartland, the habeas writ’s
65

U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
On the origins of the Chancery Court, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 96-98 (4th ed. 2002). See also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 327 (1999) (identifying “the English Court of Chancery” as the source
“from which the First Congress borrowed in conferring equitable powers on the federal courts”).
67
U.S. CONST. art I § 9 cl. 2.
68
See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of California, 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (noting that
a “habeas petition” is “an equitable remedy”); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996). As a
historical matter, the habeas remedy “was equitable in everything but name.” PAUL D. HALLIDAY,
HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 87 (2010).
69
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2004) (originally enacted as Act
of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064).
70
Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 202, 218 (1869); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944).
71
I bracket here the separate question of how federal judges give substantive content to the
Constitution. At least formally, judges do not claim to be making discretionary decisions when
they give substantive content to elements of the Constitution. If judged on the surface of their
opinions, judges behave as if their decisions as to constitutional interpretation were wholly
constrained. This means that judges’ interpretation of constitutional text is not an example of
discretionary judicial behavior. Of course, judges’ claims as shackled when interpreting the
Constitution should not be taken at face value. The Constitution does not prescribe rules for its
own interpretation, and the heated debate over that question reveals ample space for judicial
discretion. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories
of
Legal
Interpretation
(November
2014),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/fallon_10.30.14.pdf. Since judges do not concede that
they have discretion as to interpretive method—and indeed go to some length to deny it—it is not
a useful object of analysis here.
72
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.” (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 386 (1977) (Burger, J.,
concurring))).
66
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operation has been at best anemic and at worst counterproductive. Perhaps the
highest profile site of detention without ex ante process in recent years has been
the Guantánamo Naval Bay, which stood largely unregulated by the courts until
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush.73
That intervention, however, cannot be ranked a success. The Court’s
intervention in Boumediene came after a majority of detainees had been
released.74 Moreover, the decision precipitated a sharp and immediate decline
in the rate of releases—one that continues to this day.75 It is likely that this
deceleration in release rates is due not so much to Boumediene, but to the
mounting congressional opposition to detainee releases that emerged only once
President Obama entered office.76 From 2009 onward, Congress attached riders
to annual defense authorization measures categorically barring the transfer of
detainees to the United States, and also barring transfers to other countries
without an onerous Secretary of Defense certification.77 Without any formal
suspension of the habeas remedy, congressional foes of the president have
flexed democratic muscles and dramatically limited the efficacy of the writ.
Worse, the timing of judicial intervention has changed the law of
national security detention in a way deleterious to libertarian goals. My own
ongoing analysis of the government’s own documentation for detainees reveals
that by the time the Court had intervened, a substantial number of the detainees
with the strongest claims to freedom had already been released.78 This means
that the pool of remaining detainees who could proceed with post-Boumediene
habeas proceedings systematically possessed more indicia of terrorist risk than
the overall Guantánamo detainee population. As a result, the substantive and
evidentiary law of detention that has developed through post-Boumediene
district and circuits courts in the District of Columbia suffers from a selection
effect: it is based on judicial review of a sample of cases that are systematically
riskier than the randomly drawn detainee from the population. It is not
implausible to think that the underlying jurisprudence will be at least sub rosa
animated by the judges’ gestalt impression of the detainees who parade before
them on habeas.79 That is, for the de minimus libertarian effect that
73

128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 402 (2010) [hereinafter
Huq, What Good] (reporting trends in release over time).
75
Id. at 403 (reporting releases by year). In ongoing empirical work, I have examined the rate of
change in the release rate from Guantánamo. That rate dips precipitously after Boumediene, and
never recovers.
76
Id. at 418-20 (discussing political incentives of the Obama Administration).
77
The Secretary of Defense would have to certify that actions have or would be taken to
“substantially mitigate the risk of such individual engaging or reengaging in any terrorist or other
hostile activity that threatens the United States or United States persons or interests,” and that the
transfer affirmatively “is in the national security interest of the United States.” National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, §§1034, 1035(b), 127 Stat. 672, 851
(2013).
78
Aziz Z. Huq & Charles Zhang, Identifying the Predicates of Military Detention at Guantánamo
(December 2014) (on file with author).
79
Perhaps suggestive of this unease is an aside in a concurring opinion to a denial of habeas relief
by Judge Lawrence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit: “[C]andor obliges me to admit that one cannot
help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside risk to our country, and its people, of an
74
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Boumediene has had in the short time,80 it’s long term effect may be to lower
the price of liberty deprivations.
The inefficacy of habeas is not limited to the national security context.
In the less noticed immigration context, habeas once served an extensive role in
promoting legality at the border.81 Today, it has been all but abolished by
statute,82 and leaving non-citizens potentially subject to “expedited” forms of
removal that preclude judicial review of most constitutional issues.83 Nor has
postconviction variant of the Great Writ better survived the rigors of
democratic attention. Rather, as I have explored at length elsewhere,84 the
scope and effective power of postconviction habeas review has been winnowed
by both legislated changes, in particular the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act,85 and the minatory attitude of a Court that sees scant value
in ensuring state courts’ compliance with constitutional rules.86 As a
consequence of these legislated and judicially wrought changes, a vanishingly
small proportion of habeas petitioners even obtain merits review of their
claims, let alone relief,87 even as application of reticulated gatekeeping rules
sucks up judicial energy, thereby deepening the bench’s disaffection with
postconviction review.88
order releasing a detainee who is likely to return to terrorism …. I doubt any of my colleagues
will vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an
al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.” Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Silberman, J., concurring).
80
Huq, What Good, supra note 74, at 410-11 (discussing the small number of detainees released
as a consequence of habeas’s operation).
81
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 987-1020 (1998) (providing a comprehensive historical account).
82
Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1975-89 (2000) (describing changes legislated in 1996). The so-called
REAL ID Act of 2004 further narrowed the availability of habeas. See Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (REAL ID
Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, §§ 101-501, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see also Gerald L. Neuman,
On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the Real Id Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133
(2007) (explaining jurisdictional scheme and identifying constitutional concerns).
83
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (providing for judicial review of “expedited removals” limited to the
questions of whether a petitioner is an alien, whether a removal order exists, and whether the
petitioner can demonstrate refugee status).
84
Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 531-53 (2014)
[hereinafter Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court] (describing and offering a rational
reconstruction of the current scheme for postconviction habeas relief).
85
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
86
Such problems are endemic. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010).
87
NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER
THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 45 (2007), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (finding that 58 percent of noncapital
habeas petitions are dismissed on procedural grounds).
88
Democracy, in my view, is not the sole motive force pressing for the narrowing of habeas relief.
The Justices are also aware of the “acute systemic pressures” imposed by postconviction cases on
federal caseloads. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, supra note 84, at 590. Institutional selfinterest in the teeth of rising incarceration rates, therefore, also conduces to the doctrinal
narrowing of habeas.
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Even if the equitable powers of the federal courts are notable largely
by their absence from habeas jurisprudence, this does not mean that such
discretion is not exercised. To the contrary, to step back and consider not just
habeas but the full range of public law remedies for constitutional violations is
to understand that the Supreme Court does routinely exercise large equitable
discretion of a merciful character in the design of public law remedies. The
object of mercy, however, is not the victim of constitutional harms. To the
extent federal courts today exercise a merciful form of equitable discretion in
public law, it is not to enable social cohesion or to redeem historical injustice. It
is instead to exculpate the errors of the state. Dispensation from the
consequences of wrongful action is to be found in the widening gyre of
absolute and qualified immunity.89 It is in the deepening shadow of the “good
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule,90 most recently exemplified by the
Court’s willingness in Heien v. North Carolina,91 to permit a Fourth
Amendment violation to go without remedy because a police officer’s failure
even to know what the law he was enforcing required was “reasonable” if “not
… perfect.”92 Heien’s contrast with the Justices’ unforgiving, even
contemptuous, attitude to citizens’ mistakes of law almost perfectly illustrates
the distribution and quality of the Justices’ empathic investments.93 Equity in
judges’ hands, in sum, exculpates noncompliance with the Constitution and so
facilitates state coercion. It provides no platform for forgiveness or exemplar of
mercy.
The second site of constitutional mercy meriting consideration here is
the equitable discretion of the prosecutor not to pursue charges in a criminal
case, an authority that has received a constitutional imprimatur without
substantial limits.94 That discretion is not merely a function of constitutional

89

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (discussing and authorizing qualified
immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976).
90
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006); Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2419, 2427 (2011).
91
135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
92
. Id. at 536.
93
Mistakes of law occur in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context and are not given
exculpating significance there. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 531-32 (1987)
(Petitioner did not invoke Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he agreed to speak to police,
but not to give a written statement without a lawyer present.); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
424-26 (1986) (finding affirmative police misrepresentations about availability of defendant’s
lawyer did not undermine waiver of Fifth Amendment rights). The Court has also taken a pitiless
view of habeas petitioners’ filing errors, even when those errors are made in reliance upon a
judge’s directions. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007). It is, to be sure, possible to
imagine justifications for treating officials’ and citizens’ errors asymmetrically. Yet the repeated
character of officials’ encounters with the law, the distribution of educational and other epistemic
resources, and the simple possibility of training—with the concomitant risk of moral hazard from
judicial exculpation of official error—all these list against the sort of unilateral mercy that the
Court has evinced.
94
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“In the ordinary case, ‘so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.’” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
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rules, but also flowed from the shift to determinate sentencing regimes such as
the federal sentencing guidelines95 coupled to a persistent failure to control
“fact-bargaining” between prosecutors and defense attorneys out of reach of
judicial oversight.96 So far as criminal penalties go, therefore, it is more
appropriate to look at prosecutorial behavior than judicial conduct to take the
full measure of how discretionary authority is wielded.
Prosecutorial discretion under the current criminal justice dispensation
has elicited divergent assessments. In net, however, it cannot be said to further
Dean Minow’s goals related to mercy or forgiveness. On the one hand, the
sheer breadth of state and federal criminal law, coupled to the inevitable
resource constraints upon a criminal adjudicative system, lead to systematic
“leniency.”97 In some instances, prosecutorial charging discretion operates as
an offsetting counterbalance to legislative punitiveness. Empirical studies of the
introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in Massachusetts, New York,
Oregon, and New Jersey found that prosecutors “changed their practices to
avoid imposition of mandatory penalties, that the harsher punishments were
imposed in the remaining cases, and that overall there were no effects on
conviction rates.”98
On the other hand, the rise of prosecutorial discretion since the 1970s
coincided with an unprecedented four-fold leap in the incarceration rate.99
Worse, the most sophisticated recent study of discretion in the criminal justice
contexts not only finds substantial racial disparities after controlling for offense
conduct, but also concludes that “half” of those disparities “can be explained by
the prosecutor's initial charging decision—specifically, the decision to bring a
charge carrying a ‘mandatory minimum.’”100 No less than courts, chief
executives wielding the pardon pen, grand juries, and petit juries, prosecutors
are not a promising site for mitigating discretion—at least in the absence of
resource constraints that leave then no choice but to forego indictments.
To be clear, my claim is not that American legal institutions are
incapable of mercy. In January 2003, for example, Governor George Ryan
(1978))); accord Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (noting that courts are
“properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute”).
95
Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117
YALE L.J. 1420, 1494 (2008) (“The most significant consequence of the Sentencing Reform Act
was the transfer of power over punishment from judges to line prosecutors and the Department
that employs them.”).
96
Fact bargaining has been documented since the inception of the guidelines regime. See, e.g.,
Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging
and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 522
(1992).
97
SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1006 (8th ed. 2007)
(“Criminal statutes now commonly permit (or purport to require) draconian punishments that no
one expects to be imposed in the typical case,” with the result that “‘[l]eniency’ has therefore
become not merely common but a systemic imperative.”).
98
Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America 1975-2025, 42 CRIME. & JUST. 141, 166 (2013).
99
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 39 (2006) (reporting data from
late 1960s to the mid 2000s).
100
Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the
Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2013).
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pardoned four capital prisoners and commuted the sentences of the remaining
167 individuals on death row.101 But the Ryan commutation yields a clue to
why institutional mercy is so rare: Ryan was at the end of his term, and feared
no democratic reprisal.102 To the contrary, the “undemocratic” character of his
action was a central theme in the loud criticism his action elicited.103 In the
American political system, democratic sentiment—directly or indirectly, and to
greater or lesser extents—animates the unforgiving cast of prosecutorial
discretion, the demise of pardons and jury nullification, and the calcification of
judicial equity that I have described. It is only via the direct election of state
prosecutors, the electoral reward that flows to legislators for promising evermore punitive policies, and the president’s selection of Supreme Court Justices
who will be tough on crime that institutional form could have been given to the
“relentlessly punitive spirit [that] has been ascendant in the United States for
more than a generation.”104 Further, it is a paradox of American popular
government that democratic pressure at the aggregate level has likely
contracted local opportunities for democracy via juries. Public punitiveness,
that is, translates as an expansion in criminal liability and harsh, mandatory
sentences. This in turn compels a shift to pervasive plea-bargaining, and
crowds out petit juries, while rendering grand juries mere processing mills for
indictments. So it is that the Constitution’s success as a democratic regime
causes our legal institutions of mercy to flicker and falter notwithstanding their
constitutional foundations.
Yet if legal institutions of mercy have been increasingly extinguished
across the American body politic today, it is not for want of compelling need.
Rather, America’s incarceration rate is almost four times that observed in the
next most punitive Western democracy.105 Its social cost falls
disproportionately on African-American families, widening extant gulfs in
economic equality.106 Its gains, especially at the upper margin of punitiveness,
are uncertain.107 The punitive urge thereby satisfied is, perhaps unsurprisingly,
more closely correlated to racial intolerance than fear of crime or a

101

AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION 1-2 (2006).
Id. at 24-28.
103
Id. at 28.
104
TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FALL
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1, 58-63 (2014) (discussing reasons for increased public
punitiveness).
105
WESTERN, supra note 99, at 14.
106
Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 222 (2009).
107
On the one hand, the most recent research on the marginal deterrence effects of mass
incarceration reveals surprisingly little evidence of welfarist justification. Daniel S. Nagin et al.,
Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 181-87 (2009). Further, cross-national
analyses suggest that “crime rates have moved in parallel in the English-speaking countries and
western Europe since the 1960s,” suggesting that “many of the things governments have done to
reduce crime rates in recent decades have been epiphenomenal.” Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates
are Falling Throughout the Western World, 43 CRIME & JUST 1, 2-3 (2014).
102
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Durkheimian concern with maintaining social cohesion.108 This punitive
political economy, moreover, has only strengthened those interest groups that
oppose mercy, sapping the electoral power of geographic communities that
would oppose it.109 Reasonable disagreement obtains as to whether ongoing
debates about criminal justice will prove an inflection point in the development
of American attitudes to punishment.110 Whatever the path of American
criminal justice, it seems tolerably clear that the positive feedback loops of the
contemporary carceral state’s political economy mean that correcting its errors
or extinguishing its perverse or excessive consequences only becomes more
difficult with time.111 Just as American institutions are most in need of legal
institutions of mercy, therefore, their democratic pedigree means they are least
likely to keep hold of the ones bequeathed to them by the Constitution.112

108

James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A Test
of Three Competing Models, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 99, 102-07, 117 (2010) (testing three predicates
of punitiveness and finding racial animus to have the most predictive power).
109
On the one hand, prison unions and the prison industry have become increasingly powerful
lobbies; on the other hand, legislative appointment rules that assign prison populations to districts
with prisons, rather than districts of original residence, deflate urban communities’ influence at the
expense of rural communities’ power. Marie Gottschalk, Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics
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on its own,” in part because of a dominant ideological system she labels “neoliberalism.” MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 15, 17
(2014) [hereinafter GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT].
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Compare GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT, supra note 109, at 8 (stating that optimism is
“unwarranted”), with CLEAR & FROST, supra note 104, at 159-60 (arguing that “the tide has
turned”).
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The basic logic here was anticipated by MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS
36-67 (1982).
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The account I offer here stands in tension with one eloquent account of mercy’s demise,
offered by Professor Rachel Barkow. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (2008). In that essay, Barkow rejects
political economy explanations, and instead argues that “the rise of the administrative state has
made unchecked discretion an anomaly in the law.” Id. at 1334. Although I do not question the
notion that claims about unchecked discretion play some role in the public discourse concerning
mercy, see, e.g., SARAT, supra note 101, at 27, her sole focus on that role is not wholly persuasive
for a range of reasons. First, Barkow does not account for the frequency and density of discretion
that obtains without much contestation within the administrative state. See Adrian Vermeule, Our
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1107-31 (2009). It is therefore not clear
that prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution context is as distinctive as she claims. Second,
while Barkow tries to distinguish the case of prosecutorial discretion on the ground prosecutors
are more “accountable,” see Barkow, supra, at 1353, this does not explain federal prosecutors,
who are not elected and whose connection to the electorate via Main Justice and the Attorney
General may be more or less loosely articulated. Finally, attention to the moment in our national
political discourse at which discretion goes from being uncontroversial to divisive—consider here
the Ryan commutation or, more recently, President Obama’s experience with immigration
enforcement—suggests that it is less the fact of discretion, and more the manner in which that
discretion is used that engenders public hostility. Hence, in the immigration case, discretion has
long characterized immigration enforcement: It became controversial only when pivotal political
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mobilization can be told about prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice context. Barkow’s
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IV
What then might an advocate of legal institutions of mercy—as I take
Dean Minow to be—draw by way of inference from this account of our law’s
indigenous capacity for mercy and other forms of mitigating discretion? I can
conjure two inferences from our own democracy’s entanglements with mercy.
To begin with, theorists from St Anselm113 to Jeffrie Murphy114 have
observed a tension between the demands of justice and the exercise of mercy.
The above analysis suggests a further tension between the demands of
democratic rule and merciful discretion. As the late Dan Markel eloquently
argued, mercy “stands at odds with the nature of the modern liberal democratic
regime under rule of law.”115 The essence of democratic government is
representation of the people. To represent in a democratic register, whether as
delegate or trustee,116 is not to act upon unbounded caprice. It is to be
constrained by some view of what the people want or need. Markel dissolved
this problem by pointing to the democratic character of our merciful
institutions.117 The problem, however, is more difficult than he made it out to
be, not least because it begs what is colloquially known as the dead-hand
problem.118 To the extent democracy remains our desideratum, a historically
entrenched constitutionalism can be justified as a limit on current majorities so
long as it serves some other value.119 It is not enough to say that a legal
institution of mercy has a constitutional pedigree, therefore, without explaining
why it is justified as an exception from contemporaneous democratic rule.
Second, more modestly but perhaps more importantly, recent
American experience points to a deep functional incompatibility between
democracy and the discretionary provision of merciful dispensation from legal
punishments. There is, I have argued, a negative correlation between the
tendency of democratic political economies to generate a need for merciful
discretion and the capacity of legal institutions of mercy to operate. This
account, in short, focuses on a value (legality) that matters to scholars, and assumes without
warrant that it matters equally to members of the general public.
113
ST. ANSELM, PROSLOGION, 125, 127, 129 (M.J. Charlesworth trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1965).
114
Murphy, supra note 7, at 168-69.
115
Markel, supra note 10, at 1456.
116
For the canonical contemporary formulation of this distinction, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 119-21 (1967).
117
Markel, supra note 10, at 1456-57.
118
Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 606, 609 (2008) (“Th[e] dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is
feasible for the living to depart from arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our
generation participated in little of the process responsible for the text; and that the Constitution is
otherwise imperfect for our time.”).
119
A constitution’s dead hand can serve contemporary democracy too, for example by supplying
an off-the-rack set of institutional frames for elective choice, which then do not have to be
recreated from scratch with each new iteration of democratic choice. Aziz Z. Huq, The Function
of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2014). Legal institutions of mercy cannot be
vindicated in these prodemocratic terms.
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countercyclical quality renders democratic institutions of mercy, to say the
least, imperfect resources. This is not to say that legal institutions of mercy are
infeasible. To the contrary, European experience suggests that “autonomous …
bureaucracies that are relatively immune to the vagaries of public opinion” may
well be capable of mercy.120 Perhaps institutional redoubts from democratic
pressure can be constructed on American soil. The historical experience here, I
think, does not bode well.121 But Dean Minow’s ambitious and powerful words
in favor of forgiveness and mercy at a minimum ought to provide sufficient
impetus to try, and more than enough reason to think the attempt worth making.
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PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE

Cf. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, supra note 84, at 590 (arguing that courts have limited
constitutional relief out of institutional self-interest, rather than for any principled reason).
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